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Abstract
The referents of plural NP's denote groups, by their nature, but at the
same time, we want to say that they denote atomic individuals in some
cases. By analyzing such dual nature of plural NP's in Situation Semantics,
we offer a straightforward and unified analysis which accounts not only for
various readings of plural NP's but also for the so-called Committee and
Judge/Hangman Puzzles.
1 Introduction
Treatments of the contribution of plural NP's are faced with a puzzle: in some
cases we want to say that the referent of the NP is in some sense a group, composed
of subparts, and yet must contribute an individual which acts as an atomic unit
at the same time. The dual nature of plural NP's can be seen in examples like
1
(1) Two boys annoyed Carol.
In its collective reading, the referent of the subject is in some sense a group
composed of two boys, yet it acts as an atomic unit with respect to the phrase
annoyed Carol. Similarly for the coordinate subject in (2).
(2) John and Mary annoyed Carol.
I propose that the situation semantics mechanisms 1 offer a convenient way of
resolving the duality of plural NP's. I present such an analysis here and demon-
strate that the very same analysis successfully accounts for the Committee Puzzle
of [5] and the Hangman/Judge Puzzle of [6].
2 Preliminary Considerations
I distinguish (in)definite descriptions from generalized quantifiers (cf. [7], [8], [9]).
Then, the denotation of the subject of (1), for example, is a term, that is, first
order objects as opposed to higher order generalized quantifiers. The expression
two is best viewed as an adjective (as noted in the literature), and it imposes a
cardinality restriction on that term.2
Let X be the referent of the subject of (1). X is plural with respect to the
property of boyhood, but in the collective reading, we observe in addition that
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it is singular with respect to the property of annoying Carol. That is, X is two
boys and a single annoyer of Carol at the same time. However, (3) shows that
this relativity of singularity/plurality is only a result of memberships of a group.
(3) The guys and the girls married.
Let John and Tom be the guys and Mary and Alice be the girls. Let X be the ref-
erent of the subject. As the form of the subject suggests, with respect to sexuality,
X's members are JohneTom and Mary@Alice. 3 On the other hand, with respect
to marriage, the membership has to be something different (e.g. JohneMary
and TornEBAlice). 4 X's cardinalities (=2 both with respect to sexuality and with
respect to marriage) follow from these memberships, not the other way around.
Our strategy is to express the membership relativity in terms of situations.
Fortunately, situation semantics already offers a good tool for this, i.e. the notion
of resource situation.
3 The Basic Mechanism
We call a proposition of the form s p a sum proposition if one (or more) of
the constituent(s) of p is a sum individual in s; otherwise we call it an atomic
proposition. Something is a sum individual in s if it consists of more than one
thing in s; otherwise it is an atomic individual. A sum proposition is a lattice-
theoretic join of a set of atomic propositions.
When xl ,	 . , xi, are the members of x in s, Yi, Y2, • y„ are the members
of y in s, etc., we say that the set of propositions:
	
8 1 	 < /3; • • • X1) • • Y1, •
	
82	 < P, • • • , X2, • • Y2) • •
	
Sn	 P, • • • , xn, • • • , Yri) • • •
is a resolution of the sum proposition:
	
s	 P, . . . , x, . . , y,	 >>
such that:
s = S1 ED S2 ei • • • ED Sn
Note that nothing in principle prohibits e.g. yi = yi or s i =	 where i j. A sum
proposition has to be justified by being resolved to a set of atomic propositions.
Looking "bottom-up," on the other hand, assume that 5 1 , 52 ,	 sn are the
sub-situations of s and that:
P, . . . ,	 ... >>
82	 < P, • • • , X2, • • •
Sn	 P, • • • , xn, • • •
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If, for each i, xi is the j-th argument, then for all such j (including polarity), if
xi , x2 , • • • , xn have a join, then s has to support the atomic infon:
where x x i ED e • • • xn
With these mechanisms in hand, we analyze (1) as follows.5
	
(4) a. r	 boy, X; 1
b. members({x i , x21, X, r)
c. d	 annoyed, X, Carol; 1 >>
The resource situation r is X's boy situation, and (4b) says that X has two
members x i and x2 in r. Thus, X is a sum individual in r. The only possible
resolution is the set of atomic propositions in (5).
	
(5) a. r1
	boy, xi ; 1 >>
	
b. r2
	boy, x2; 1 >>
Thus, both xi and x2 are boys.
On the other hand, (4) itself does not tell whether X is a sum individual or an
atomic individual in d. If it is atomic, then (4c) is already resolved, and hence, we
get the collective reading (that is, X is plural as boys but singular as an annoyer;
intuitively, X annoyed Carol not as individual persons but rather as a group).
In contrast, if X is a sum individual in d, we get the distributive reading. By
structural constraints, we know that (4a-b) can be the case only if (6a-b) are also
the case, where p is X's individual person situation.
	
(6) a. p	 person, X >>; 1
b. members({x i , X2}, X, p)
The distributive reading arises when p overlaps with d so that (7) is also the case.
(7) members({x i , x21, X, d)
In such a case, (4c) is a sum proposition, and its only possible resolution is the
set of propositions in (8), and hence, the distributive reading arises.
	
(8) a. di	 annoyed, x i , Carol; 1 >>
	
b. d2	annoyed, x2 , Carol; 1
Intuitively, X annoyed Carol as individual persons.
K.Ishikawa
4 How the Theory Works
4.1 More Complicated Cases
Generally speaking, there can be more than one possible resolution to a given sum
proposition, and the resolutions with respect to resource situations and described
situations do not have to coincide. Such is the case in (3), for example, which is
analyzed as in (9).
(9) a. members({Xi, X2}, X, r)
b. d< married, X; 1 >>
where r is X's sexuality situation with two sub-situations r i and r2 such that:6
	
(10) a. ri
	guy, Xi ; 1 >>
	
b. r2	girl, X2; 1 >>
If, as illustrated above, John and Tom are the guys in question and Mary and
Alice are the girls in question, then the followings obtain in addition.
(11) a. members({John, Tom}, X i , ri)
b. members({Mary, Alice}, X2, r2)
However, nothing forces d to give the same membership to X. For example, in
the case considered above, where John and Mary married and Tom and Alice
married, the followings are the case in addition.
(12) a. members({Yi , Y2 1, X, d)
b. members({John, Mary}, Yi,p)
c. members({Tom, Alice}, Y2, p)
d is X's marriage situation (and hence X's couple situation). p is their individual
person situation (and hence not a sub-situation of d). Thus, (9b) has to be resolved
to:
	
(13) a. di	 married, Y1 ; 1 >>
	
b. d2	married, Y2; 1
However, Y1 and Y2 are atomic in d, and hence, we cannot infer from (13a) that
John married, for example.
Note that this is an instance of intermediate reading (cf. [12]), in which a
"distributive" inference is valid but not to the atomic level.
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4.2 Cumulative Reading
Consider (14).
(14) Two students bought four books.
(14) has a variety of readings. The most simple one is that a group of two
students bought a group of four books together (and hence co-ownership of the
books). Somewhat more complicated ones arise when either one of the subject or
the object is read collectively and the other is read distributively. These readings
are analyzed in exactly the same ways illustrated above. The third kind of reading
arises when both the subject and the object are read distributively. Here, there are
two cases. Either the total number of the students (or books) in question exceeds
two (or four) (quantificational readings), or the total number of the students in
question is exactly two and that of the books is four (cumulative readings; [13]).
Remember that nothing in our definition of resolution forces there to be a
unique resolution nor require the arguments of an atomic proposition in the reso-
lution to be distinct from their corresponding arguments of another atomic propo-
sition in the resolution. It only requires that the joins of the arguments of the
atomic propositions in the resolution be the arguments of the sum proposition
respectively. Then, given that (14) is analyzed as (15),8 and given that the dis-
tributive memberships in (15b) and (15d) obtain with respect to d too,
(15) a. rsbj	 student, X; 1
b. members({x i , x21, X , rsbi)
c. robs l=< book, Y;1 >>
d. members({yi , Y2, Y3) y4}1 robj)
e. d	 bought, X, Y;1
one can resolve (15e) to x 1 's buying y1 and x2 's buying y2 , y3 and y4 , or to xi's
buying yi
 and y2
 and x2 's buying y3
 and y4 , etc. Thus, we do not need such a
thing as branching quantification in order to analyze cumulative readings.9
4.3 Coordination
Our analysis contrasts with Link's [5] in that the collective/distributive ambiguity
is not analyzed in terms of an ontological distinction between a set of individuals
and a group in ours. Now, sentences like (16), 10 in which the subject is read col-
lectively with respect to one predicate and distributively with respect to another,
pose a problem for Link's approach, as Landman [6] correctly points out.
(16) The boys met at school and were wearing golden earrings.
This poses a problem for Link's approach, as Landman [6] correctly points out,
for Link would not be able to decide which ontological entity the subject should
denote.
Let X be the referent of the subject. In our analysis, (16) describes two
situations. The first is X's meeting situation, described by the first conjunct VP,
— 25 —
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in which X is atomic. In the second one, which is X's earring-wearing situation
described by the second conjunct VP, X's is a sum individual. Membership is
relative to each situation, and hence, such sentences pose no problem for our
analysis.
5 The Committee and Judge/Hangman Puzzles
Link [5] used the following "puzzle" to motivate his ontological distinction men-
tioned above. That is, we cannot conclude (17b) from (17a) if the visits are as
the official ones as the committees, even if Committee A necessarily consists of
the same members as Committee B (e.g. by law).
(17) a. Committee A paid an official visit to South Africa.
b. Committee B paid an official visit to South Africa.
However, as Landman [6] correctly points out, this "puzzle" arises even in the
case of singular nouns. For example, (18c) does not follow from (18a-b) if the
strikes in (18a) and (18c) are as a judge and as a hangman, respectively.
(18) a. The judge is on strike.
b. The judge is the hangman.
c. The hangman is the judge.
Let John be the judge/hangman. Note that, in order to be on strike, you
have to have some occupation. Being on strike while having no occupation simply
does not make sense, so we assume that if a situation supports someone's being
on strike, then it has to be his or her occupation situation (or one of his or
her occupation situations, if he or she has more than one occupation). Then,
the described situation of (18a), j, under the intended reading, is John's judge
situation (i.e. the resource situation coincides with the described situation). Thus,
	
(19) a. j
	
judge, John; 1 >>
	
b. j	 on-strike, John; 1
However, it does not follow from this that John is on strike also in his hangman
situation h, which is the described situation of (18c) under the intended read-
ing. Similarly for (17). Of course, the inferences in question fail only under the
intended readings; for example, if (18c) is uttered as a description of the judge sit-
uation, our analysis correctly predicts that (18c) follows from the intended reading
of (18a) and (18c).11
On the other hand, (20c) always follows from (20a) and (20b)
(20) a. The judge has a big nose.
b. The judge is the hangman.
c. The hangman has a big nose.
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This is because (20a) and (20c) both describe the judge/hangman's facial feature
situation. The difference between (18) and (20) comes from the fact that, while
one can have only one face (facial feature situation), and hence there is only one
candidate for the described situations of (20a) and (20c), he or she can have more
than one occupation (occupation situation), and hence there are more than one
candidate for the described situations of (18a) and (18c).
Thus, our analysis of plural NP's accommodates the Committee and Judge/
Hangman Puzzles too.
Finally, we illustrate how our lattice-theoretic assumption and our account of
the Judge/Hangman Puzzle interact. First, note that sentences like (18a) can
be "disambiguated" by adding an as-phrase (as correctly observed in [6]). For
example, if we add as a judge, then (18a) is about John's judge situation, but if
we add as a hangman, then it's about his hangman situation. Then, according to
our analysis, such as-phrases are to be understood as restriction on the described
situations. Now consider (21) (again, taken from [6]).
(21) a. As a judge, John earns (exactly) $50,000.
b. As a janitor, John earns (exactly) $10,000.
c. As a judge and a janitor, John earns (exactly) $60,000.
(21c) follows from (21a-b). Let S i and s2 be John's judge situation and his jan-
itor situation, respectively. Then, (21a-b) are analyzed (roughly) as in (22a-b),
respectively.
(22) a. S i 	 earn, John, $50, 000;1 >>
b. s2	earn, John, $10, 000;1
Let s i and s2 be the sub-situations of s. Then, our "bottom-up" definition dictates
that s should support a sum proposition whose resolution is (22). Note that
Johne,John,John and $50,0008410,000=$60,000. Then, we predict that (23) is
the case.
(23) s	 earn, John, $60, 000;1
This is exactly the analysis we want for (21c).
6 Conclusion
Thus, our analysis straightforwardly accounts for the collective, distributive and
intermediate readings as well as cumulative reading. It also explains the Commit-
tee and Judge/Hangman Puzzles with the same mechanism. All of these issues
become a matter of what situation is being described. I take our results as argu-
ments for the situation semantic notions of situatedness and resource situation,
which are the key ingredients of our analysis.12
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Notes
*This research was conducted while I was a Fulbright scholar at the University of
California, Santa Cruz. I would like to thank Bill Ladusaw as well as the audience
of the joint conference. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 [1], [2], [3],
 [4], among others.
2By absorbing such a term, our mechanism can yield a "quantificational"
reading" of Two boys lifted a piano, where the two boys lifted different pianos,
but we do not focus on such readings in this paper. For absorption, see [3].
3We assume a lattice-theoretic ontology of individuals (cf. [5]). We also assume
a lattice-theoretic ontology of situations, as will be seen below.
4Where heterosexual marriage is assumed.
5 For expository reasons, we ignore the issues on reference dealt with in [10,11]
here and assume the standard, model-theoretic interpretation of terms.
6The "bottom-up" assumption dictates nothing about r, so r might or might
not support the infons in (10).
7As mentioned above, these readings can be obtained by absorbing either the
subject or object parameter.
8When no absorption is involved.
9Essentially, our analysis of cumulative reading is the same as Krifka's ([14]).
What is new with our analysis is the unified treatment of the range of issues
covered in this paper (note that, situations not only give the lattice-theoretic
structures of individuals but also play the role that NU plays in Krifka's theory,
roughly speaking; however, we do not address the issues of aspect and negation
in this paper).
On the other hand, note that branching-quantifier analyses (e.g. [13]) signifi-
cantly complicate the syntax (since the subject and the object of (14) would have
to form a syntactico-semantic constituent), but there is no obvious independent
syntactic motivation for such complication.
10 Taken from [6] (p.598) with slight simplification.
11 If John is on strike as a judge but not on strike as a hangman, then:
(i) j	 on-strike, John; 1
(ii) h I=< on-strike, John; 0 >>
Then, should the situation j GD,h support John's being on strike or his being not on
strike? Our "bottom-up" definition says nothing in such a case, since the "second"
arguments, the polarities, of (i)-(ii) are incompatible with each other and hence
fail to have a join.
Personally, I'm inclined to assume that j h supports no "on-strike" infon,
rather than to assume that it supports "on-strike" infons with an increased arity
(cf. [2]), but I do not have an argument for this assumption.
12One thing that remains unaccounted for is number agreement. In the case of
examples like (i)-(ii), we could simply say that the number agreement information
has to be satisfied in the resource situations, since the referents of the subjects are
sum individuals only in the resource situations (they are atomic in the described
situations).
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(i) John and Mary are/*is a nice couple.
(ii) John and Mary are/*is carrying the piano upstairs (together).
However, there are some problems concerning agreement that I have not solved.
First, we also observe that, for example, (iii) allows singular agreement.
(iii) John and Mary are/is a nice group.
I do not know the source of the difference between (i) and (iii) yet. The second,
and closely related to the first, problem comes from examples like (iv) (taken from
[15,16]).
(iv) Doing phonology problems and drinking vodka make/makes me sick.
With the plural agreement, this is ambiguous depending on whether the subject is
read collectively or distributively. However, with the singular agreement, it only
has the collective reading. I do not yet have a satisfactory account to offer for
this.
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